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Abstract 
To manage citizen evaluations of government performance, public officials use blame 
avoidance strategies when communicating performance information. We examine two 
prominent presentational strategies: scapegoating and spinning, while testing how public 
responses vary depending on whether they are ideologically aligned with the public 
official. We examine these relationships in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, 
where the Trump administration sought to shift blame by scapegoating outgroups (by 
using the term “Chinese virus”), and framing performance information on COVID-19 
testing in positive terms. Using a novel pre-registered survey experiment that 
incorporates open and close-ended items, we offer three main findings. First, there is 
clear evidence of motivated reasoning: conservatives rate the performance of the Trump 
administration more positively and are more apt to blame prominent Democrats, Chinese 
residents and the Chinese Government. Second, performance information framing was 
found to impact blame attribution among conservatives, but only for open-ended 
responses. Third, while exposure to the term “Chinese virus” increased blame assigned to 
Chinese residents among all participants, conservatives exposed to the term appeared to 
blame President Trump more, suggesting repeated use of divisive blame shifting 
strategies may alienate even supporters.  
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 A close-up photograph of Trump at the podium in mid-March made clear that he 
had used a Sharpie pen to replace the term “Coronavirus” with “Chinese virus” (Karni 
2020). Across subsequent press conferences, rallies and tweets, Trump and White House 
officials repeatedly invoked the term “Chinese virus,” and less frequently, variants such 
as “Wuhan virus,” or “Kung Flu.” It wasn’t just the Trump administration; the 
Republican Party sent memos to its candidates urging them to blame China (Insenstadt 
2020). Around the same time, Asian-Americans reported increased racial hostility 
(Kandil 2020).  
These actions by the Trump administration can be read as a classic if 
extraordinary attempt to shift blame away from what was broadly seen as a poor 
administrative response to the pandemic. A pervasive negativity bias in the electorate 
(Lau 1982; Soroka 2014) implies that elected officials have strong incentives to redirect 
blame through the use of presentational strategies that seek to manage perceptions of 
government performance (Hood 2010; Weaver 1986). Information asymmetries between 
the government and public coupled with the complexity of public service provision 
facilitate efforts to avoid blame by making it difficult for the public to identify what went 
wrong, and who was responsible (Lupia 1994; Swindell and Kelly 2002; James, Jilke, 
Petersen and Van de Walle 2016).  
In this paper, we examine two presentational blame avoidance strategies that 
governments employ to manage perceptions of performance. The first is to “spin” 
information about an event to avoid blame (Hood 2010). The second is to deflect blame 
through the use of a scapegoat (Weaver 1986). While scapegoats in blame avoidance 
studies are typically other policy actors – e.g. ministers, opposition, bureaucrats, or 
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private service providers – we extend research on blame shifting presentational strategies 
by focusing on ethnic outgroups evoked by the term “Chinese virus.”  
Episodes of blame avoidance are fundamentally debates about government 
performance, making performance information central to such discussions (Nielsen and 
Baekgard 2015; Nielsen and Moynihan 2017; Petersen, Laumann and Jakobsen 2019). In 
addition to using the term “Chinese virus,” another Trump administration strategy was to 
frame how performance was discussed – consistent with Hood’s (2010) characterization 
of spinning as a presentational strategy. When Trump repeatedly (and falsely) insisted 
that anyone who wanted a virus test could have one, he was directing attention to a very 
specific metric of government performance – testing availability, rather than death rates, 
hospitalizations, or the reproduction of the virus – and framing it in positive terms. Do 
these presentational strategies change how the public assigned blame for government 
performance? We address this question in the context of motivated reasoning. 
The COVID-19 pandemic resulted in mass death and a fundamental test of 
governance capacity and leadership skill, offering a perfect setting to study the effects of 
presentational strategies as a tool for blame avoidance. In the United States, a deeply 
polarized political environment appeared to undermine efforts toward a coordinated civic 
and government response (Allcott et al. 2020; Kettl 2020). Daily press conferences 
convened by elected officials and ubiquitous media coverage regularly exposed the 
public to large amounts of performance information and illustrated the presentational 
blame avoidance strategies described above. COVID-19 is hereby a key case where 
presentational strategies for blame avoidance are routinely used on a daily basis by 
politicians and public managers.  
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This study uses the case of the COVID-19 pandemic to advance our 
understanding of how three key theoretical variables shape the impact of presentational 
strategies on the public’s willingness to assign blame and who they assign blame to, 
when asked to evaluate government performance. The first is motivated reasoning, where 
we generally expect conservatives to be more sympathetic to a Republican President, and 
more responsive to his efforts to avoid blame. The second is the framing of performance 
information, where we examine if positive framing of a key performance metric, the 
availability of COVID-19 tests, reduces blame. Third, we examine the effect of using a 
scapegoat cue – the use of the term Chinese virus – when conveying performance 
information. This attempt to scapegoat relies on people’s inherent tendency to credit 
groups they identify with for positive events and blame groups they do not identify with 
for negative events (Pettigrew 1979; Gilbert and Malone 1995; Swim and Sanna 1996).  
Our empirical analysis offers important theoretical contributions to public 
management literature on blame avoidance. Previous work has considered how motivated 
reasoning affects how the public interprets crises (Bisgaard 2015) and how they process 
performance information on health policy issues (James and Van Ryzin 2017). Our 
contribution comes from offering insight into how the framing of performance 
information and use of scapegoat cues in a highly polarized context shapes the way the 
public processes government performance information to attribute responsibility. 
Existing studies have not considered the role of ethnic-group characteristics in shaping 
patterns of performance evaluation and responsibility attribution. Such considerations are 
especially salient for tasks where outcomes are co-produced by the public and 
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government – such as halting a contagious disease – because cooperation appears less 
likely to emerge if some groups are scapegoated.   
To make these contributions we use a novel pre-registered research design that 
leverages a survey experiment of US residents1. Additionally, we employ machine 
learning techniques to analyze how open-ended responses vary in relation to the 
performance information participants were randomly assigned to. This approach helps to 
elaborate upon the close-ended responses (Roberts et al 2014), while responding to recent 
calls for public administration research to incorporate machine learning (Anastasopoulos 
and Whitford 2019).  
Three key findings emerge from our analysis. First, we find evidence of motivated 
reasoning. Conservatives were less likely to see the COVID-19 crisis as a serious threat, a 
performance failure, or to attribute blame to a Republican President and administration. 
Instead, they were more likely to blame targets of the President’s criticism: former 
President Obama, Speaker Nancy Pelosi, the media, state governments, the Chinese 
government and Chinese-Americans. These findings are supported in an analysis of the 
open-ended responses.  
Second, we show that using a scapegoat cue as a presentational strategy generally 
induces outgroup blaming. Participants exposed to the term Chinese virus were more apt 
to blame ethnic Chinese residents for the spread of COVID-19 in the United States 
relative to other ethnic groups. Notably, there is no effect of the scapegoat cue on blame 
assigned to the Chinese government. We also find that conservatives exposed to the term 
 
1 Pre-registration can be found at: https://osf.io/k28sz/?view_only=8240e043be3a4849829cece7afcf9db4 
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Chinese virus were more likely to assign blame to public officials generally, including 
President Trump, creating a potential backlash for those using the term.  
Third, we find evidence of a significant impact of the performance information 
framing presentational strategy for open-ended, but not close-ended items. These results 
help to shed light on the way individuals reason using performance information, 
suggesting that in complex, rapidly evolving contexts, individuals are susceptible to 
performance information framing, yet also reflect on the data before assigning blame. 
Specifically, while extant work on performance information framing documents a 
negativity bias in responses to performance information (Nielsen and Moynihan, 2017; 
Van Bekerom, van der Voet, and Christensen 2020), we show that blame attribution is 
not only impacted by negatively-, but also positively-framed performance information, 
and that who actors blame depends on the frame they are exposed to. 
 Next, we establish our expectations about how the key variables we examine 
shape responsibility attribution for public sector performance before providing more 
detail about the data and analysis. 
 
Performance Information and Responsibility Attribution  
Responsibility attribution results from speculation on the causes of performance an 
individual has observed (Heider 1958; Jones and Davis 1965). That is, exposure to 
performance information not only triggers performance evaluations, but also attributions 
of responsibility, especially for poor performance (Olsen 2015). However, the link 
between performance information and responsibility attribution is contested (Redlawsk 
2002). While many theories assume individuals will use evidence to objectively and 
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accurately assign blame for poor performance (Gerber and Green 1998), information 
users often fall short of this standard.  
How the performance of public officials is evaluated, and how their presentational 
blame avoidance strategies are received is influenced by their perceived ideological 
alignment with their audience. Partisans engage in motivated reasoning to find and 
interpret information that limits blame to co-partisans and shifts blame to actors, such as 
politicians, they disagree with (Lodge and Taber 2000). In other words, rather than using 
performance information to arrive at more accurate conclusions, individuals are 
motivated to reason in a direction that confirms predetermined conclusions and aligns 
with preexisting biases (Olsen, Moynihan, James and Van Ryzin 2020).  
The processing of performance information for attribution might also be driven by 
cognitive biases. These biases can be accentuated by presentational strategies. For 
example, negativity bias can be triggered by presenting numbers in negative, rather than 
positive, terms (Olsen 2015). Biases against outgroups might be activated by racial cues 
that trigger racial resentment (Whitehead, Smith, and Eichhorn 1982). The potential for 
scapegoating members of outgroups seems especially relevant for public sector tasks that 
are co-produced, i.e., where government relies on efforts from the public to achieve its 
goals. If accountability is driven by attribution processes to those perceived as 
responsible for outcomes, co-produced outcomes involve not just vertical models of 
accountability – blaming public officials – but also horizontal models – blaming other 
members of the public. In sum, the COVID-19 setting is ripe for scapegoat triggers to 
shape blame attribution for performance outcomes.  
We examine each of these processes in turn. 
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Partisan Motivated Reasoning and Blame Attribution 
Motivated reasoning suggests citizens evaluate members of the political party they 
identify with more positively and are more critical of the performance of parties they 
oppose (Taber and Lodge 2006). Jilke and Baekgaard (2020) show that citizen 
satisfaction with public services increases or decreases depending on whether co-
partisans are in power. While crises can sometimes engender a tendency to “rally around 
the flag,” political ideology offers a heuristic by which individuals make sense of crises 
where the situation is dynamic and the facts are contested (Bisgaard 2015). For example, 
liberal voters tended to blame a Republican President after the poor response to 
Hurricane Katrina, while Republicans blamed a Democratic governor (Malhotra and Kuo 
2008).   
Given that the claims of motivated reasoning are relatively well-established and 
not theoretically novel, our goal here is to simply observe if such processes hold in the 
COVID-19 case. More specifically, we expect conservatives to differ from the rest of the 
population significantly in how they interpret the crisis, with conservatives less likely to 
acknowledge the scale of the threat and more likely to positively evaluate the 
performance of Republican political leadership. We also expect conservatives to be more 
likely to attribute responsibility toward actors that President Trump has persistently 
sought to shift blame towards, such as President Obama, the mainstream media, state 
Governors, the Chinese government, and Chinese residents of the United States.  
H1: Motivated reasoning will lead to differences in how conservatives and non-
conservatives assess the severity of the pandemic, assess the performance of political 
leadership, and allocate responsibility to actors inside and outside of the United States 
federal government.  
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Performance Information Framing as a Presentational Strategy 
Performance measurement systems are premised on the hope they can make blame 
attribution easier, by rendering governmental outcomes more legible to the public. But 
performance measures are frequently subjected to presentational strategies by elected 
officials who seek to muddy responsibility attribution (Bevan and Hood 2006), and bias 
processes of interpretation (James, Moynihan, Olsen and Van Ryzin 2020).  
While how much people actively use performance information to make decisions 
is up for debate, a variety of studies suggests that citizens do use that information to form 
judgments and make decisions, especially in visible and salient service areas, such as 
education and health. In the United States, if schools were categorized as failing under 
the No Child Left Behind Act, they became less likely to win new resources via referenda 
(Kogan, Lavertu, and Peskowitz, 2016). Parents were also more apt to move their kids to 
other schools (Holbein 2016). White parents, in particular, were more likely to exit 
schools and to vote in local school board elections after negative performance scores, 
while black parents were more likely to vote but not to exit (Holbein 2019).  
Such work also suggests the possibility of a negativity bias in how people use 
performance information in making responsibility attributions: the idea that negative 
performance scores gain attention and activate responsibility attribution in a way that 
positive performance does not. For example, James and John (2007) find that people 
punish incumbents for poor performance but observe no significant gains in support when 
an incumbent performs well. Similarly, Olsen (2015) finds that people exposed to 
negatively framed public health information are more likely to engage in attributional 
reasoning than individuals exposed to positively framed information. Such attributions 
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may affect decisions around funding and management reforms (Nielsen and Baekgaard 
2015), and even how public managers are treated: for example, elected officials show the 
same tendency to focus on poor performance when attributing blame to school principals 
(Nielsen and Moynihan 2017).  
One reason for negativity bias is that the audience is actually discriminating 
between different levels of performance, and appropriately blaming poor performers. 
Another reason is that negative numbers trigger cognitive processes that focus on failure 
(Baumeister et al. 2001; Olsen 2015; Rozin and Rozyman 2001). To get solely at the 
latter process, we use equivalence framing (Belardinelli et al. 2018; Fuzenzalida et al. 
2018; Olsen 2015). In other words, respondents are shown the same public health 
performance information but in some instances it was negatively framed (percent of 
public seeking a test that was not tested for the virus), and in some cases it will be 
positively framed (percent of the public seeking a test that was tested for the virus). The 
use of equivalence frames thereby limits evaluations to how the information is framed, 
rather than about the actual level of performance. Negatively framed performance 
information should elicit more negative performance evaluations than logically 
equivalent positively framed performance information.  
Another advantage of equivalence framing is that it closely mirrors presentational 
strategies aimed at “spinning” performance information: when politicians can’t change 
the actual level of performance they try to change its meaning (Bevan and Hood 2005; 
Moynihan 2008). In the context of COVID-19, a closely watched indicator of the 
government’s efforts was its ability to provide tests for the virus. President Trump tried to 
frame testing rates positively, by insisting that many tests have been done and that their 
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number had rapidly increased, and by repeatedly asserting the false claim that everyone 
who wanted a test could get one (Bump 2020). This effort to positively spin testing 
numbers is intended to avoid the negative reasoning that comes from looking at the same 
numbers and noting that the volume of tests did not meet demand. Thus, we use a widely 
employed frame to isolate negative reasoning that is thematically consistent with actual 
political efforts to positively frame one of the most closely scrutinized performance 
indicators of the response.  
H2: Exposure to negatively framed performance information will trigger more negative 
performance evaluations of actors in the United States federal government than exposure 
to positively framed performance information.  
 
H3: Exposure to negatively framed performance information will trigger greater 
responsibility attribution to actors in the United States federal government than exposure 
to positively framed performance information. 
 
Public assessments of performance information are also colored by motivated reasoning. 
Compelling evidence on the intersection of processes of interpreting performance 
information and motivated reasoning comes from Van Bekerom, van der Voet, and 
Christensen (2020). They show that public organizations face a negativity bias in the 
form of greater punishment from members of the public for poor performance relative to 
private firms, with the effect driven by those with an ideological predisposition to believe 
private firms performed better. Other studies tie motivated reasoning to partisan identity. 
Republican voters, who generally opposed the Affordable Care Act, were more apt to 
select performance information that made the Act look less positive and interpret 
performance information about the Act more negatively, especially when primed to think 
about their political identity (James and Van Ryzin 2017; Jilke 2018). Bisgaard (2019: 
824) shows that even though partisans may evaluate performance information accurately, 
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they are selective in how they attribute responsibility, doing so in ways that “fit their 
preferred worldviews.” 
H4: Conservatives exposed to the negatively framed performance information will be 
more likely to blame actors outside of the United States federal government when 
compared to those exposed to positively framed performance information. 
 
Scapegoating as a Presentational Strategy 
Public management research is most attentive to directional reasoning that is driven by 
political ideology. However, there are other sources of directional reasoning. The search 
for justification for a judgment is biased by a more profound effort on the part of the 
evaluator to maintain a positive self-image, tied to what is sometimes referred to as the 
fundamental error of attribution: when performance is good, we find reasons to take 
credit and when performance is bad we find reasons to blame others. For example, 
teachers attribute responsibility to their own efforts when shown data that indicates that 
their school performs well. But if shown data that the school is performing poorly, they 
are apt to blame others, such as elected officials, the Ministry of Education, or parents 
(Petersen, Laumann and Jakobsen 2018).  
The persistent tendency to privilege certain explanations of observed performance 
over others results in attribution errors, where an evaluator crafts narratives that absolve 
them and the groups they identify with from responsibility for negative events (Haider-
Markel and Joslyn 2017: 361). These outgroups can be constructed in different ways. An 
obvious source of difference is ethnic or racial differences. For example, Fishman, 
Rattner, and Weinmann (1987) found that Israeli Jews were more likely to blame Israeli 
Arabs for crimes than other Israeli Jews. Ben-Porath and Shaker (2010) show that 
including photographs of black Hurricane Katrina victims from the City of New Orleans 
 13 
resulted in whites blaming (predominantly black) residents of the City more for the 
consequences of Hurricane Katrina. Maeder, Yamamoto, McManus, and Capaldi (2016) 
show that a sample of predominantly white participants were significantly more likely to 
blame black defendants for a crime than white defendants, despite the circumstances 
surrounding the crime being the same. Within public management research, racial 
differences are well-established as a potential source of bias in how street-level 
bureaucrats and policymakers evaluate minority groups, especially in the context of 
welfare services (Jilke and Tummers 2018). However, we have no evidence as to where 
ethnic scapegoat triggers fall in the blame attribution landscape when the public is asked 
to examine performance information.  
 In the context of COVID-19, the use of the term “Chinese virus” offered what 
appeared to be a straightforward effort to shift blame by triggering outgroup biases. The 
World Health Organization, who typically name such viruses, has a policy of not using 
names that evoke specific places or groups to avoid stigma (New York Times, 2020). 
Their official choice of COVID-19 was established on February 11. From early March 
some Republicans began to use the term Chinese virus or Wuhan Virus, and Trump 
included Chinese virus in a tweet by mid-March, before making it a staple – and a subject 
of reporter’s questions – in his daily press briefings related to the pandemic. While 
President Trump acknowledged this presentational strategy was intended to direct 
attention at the culpability of the Chinese government, it raised concerns about 
stigmatizing Asian-Americans generally (Rogers, Jakes, and Swanson 2020). “Spit On, 
Yelled At, Attacked: Chinese-Americans Fear for Their Safety” read one headline 
(Tavernise and Oppel Jr. 2020). 
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Noting these reports, and acknowledging that public health is a public service 
whose performance is shaped by inputs from both government and the public, we test if 
being exposed to the term “Chinese virus” in a description of COVID-19 acts as a racial 
or nationalistic cue that shields the government from blame, and causes greater blame 
towards Chinese residents of the United States and the Chinese government. We also 
examine if this effect is greater for conservatives who identify with the political actors 
associated with such strategies.  
H5: Participants exposed to the term 'Chinese virus' will be more likely to blame Chinese 
residents and the Chinese government when compared to participants exposed to the 
term 'COVID - 19.' 
 
H6: The effect of the “Chinese virus” framing on blaming Chinese residents and the 
Chinese government will be greatest for conservatives. 
 
Setting and Research Design 
We use a survey experiment to examine the effect of two presentational blame 
avoidance strategies – scapegoating and equivalency framing – on responsibility 
attribution during the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic. On January 21st, 2020 the United States 
reported its first confirmed case of COVID-19 (CDC 2020). By March 21st, the United 
States reported 24,583 confirmed cases of COVID-19. Around the same time, the Trump 
administration began to hold daily press conferences where performance information, 
which often focused on testing rates, was provided to the public. During these press 
conferences, President Trump would also frequently refer to COVID-19 as the “Chinese 
virus.” By late June, the United States reported over 2.5 million confirmed cases of 
COVID-19 and more than 120 thousand related deaths. These numbers were more than 
twice those of Brazil, the country with the next highest number of confirmed COVID-19 
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cases and related deaths. Our experiment was run between June 24th and June 27th, 2020, 
four days after a high-profile campaign rally in Oklahoma held by President Trump 
where the president prominently referred to COVID-19 as the “Chinese virus” and 
“Kung-flu.”  
In our survey experiment, respondents were randomly assigned to one of four 
different treatment groups, representing a 2 by 2 between subjects design, plus one 
additional baseline group (Appendix A provides the exact wording of the prompts). The 
baseline group provides estimates for patterns of motivated reasoning absent 
experimental exposure to our performance framing or scapegoat cue. However, it is 
important to acknowledge that participants assigned to a control will have been exposed 
to versions of such treatments from the universal media coverage and political messaging 
around the pandemic. Our experimental results should therefore be read as relatively 
conservative tests of the blame avoidance strategies, since the non-treated subjects will, 
to some degree, have been exposed to those same strategies. While a limitation of our 
research, this is an inevitable tradeoff of trying to model highly visible and salient blame 
avoidance efforts.  
In the baseline group, individuals are told that the Trump administration is dealing 
with the challenge of testing residents for a new and potentially dangerous virus - no 
performance information and no ethnic outgroup cue is provided. The 2 by 2 treatment 
matrix varies on a) whether performance information is framed positively or negatively 
and b) whether the term “Chinese virus” or the more neutral “COVID-19” is mentioned. 
Our performance information are presented as COVID-19 testing capacity, which is 
framed in terms of the percent of people seeking tests who can be tested (e.g., 65%) 
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versus percent of people seeking tests who cannot be tested (e.g., 35%). Since it is 
possible that respondents might be more influenced by round-number integers (James, 
Moynihan, Olsen and Van Ryzin, 2020), thus as a form of stimuli sampling, we randomly 
varied the integers that subjects were exposed to (between a range of 51-99% for those 
who can be tested and 1-49% for those who cannot be tested).  
 Finally, we conducted chi-square tests to examine whether randomization was 
successful and all groups to which participants were assigned were balanced on key 
covariates. Results reveal no significant differences across treatment groups in terms of 
participant race (p = .789), education (p = 0.301), age (p = 0.384), party affiliation (p = 
0.273), political ideology (p = 0.237), political trust (p = 0.294), and gender (p = 0.953). 
We do detect an imbalance across treatment groups in terms of income (p = 0.047). 
Therefore, we ran all models controlling for income and detected no significant variation 
when compared to models that did not control for income Analyses that include income 
as a control variable can be found in the supplementary materials.   
 
Sample  
 A total of 1500 United States based participants were recruited for our experiment 
using CloudResearch, a research platform that integrates with Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk (MTurk)2. While MTurk allows requestors to recruit workers to fulfill a range of 
tasks, such as responding to surveys, it was not designed specifically for the purposes of 
conducting academic research. Noting the popularity of MTurk among researchers, the 
CloudResearch platform was created for the specific purpose of assisting researchers 
 
2 An explanation of how the sample size was calculated is included in the preregistration. 
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recruit MTurk participants to take part in research by, for example, allowing researchers 
to screen out multiple responses from the same worker and to recruit a more diverse pool 
of participants (Litman, Robinson, and Abberbock 2017), although online convenience 
samples like ours are not representative of the general population. Researchers have 
raised concerns over the possibility of demand effects (Mummolo and Peterson 2019) in 
online convenience samples, but responses appear to be highly comparable to those 
obtained using more representative samples (Coppock, Leeper, and Mullinix 2018; 
Coppock and McClellan 2019; Mullinix, Leeper, Druckman, and Freese 2015).  
Sampling criteria used in recruitment included approval ratings (greater than 
94%) and number of hits (greater than 1000)3. Data were cleaned following procedures 
outlined by Mason and Suri (2012) as well as those of Dennis, Goodson, and Pearson 
(2018). Incomplete responses, responses completed in an unusually short amount of time 
(less than 180 seconds), and multiple responses from the same IP address were screened 
out, leaving 1439 usable responses. 
 
Measured Variables 
 We evaluate political ideology using a 6-point scale that ranges from very 
conservative to very liberal. Using this scale, we create a conservative dummy variable, 
that groups participants who identify as very conservative, conservative, and slightly 
conservative together as conservative (1), and participants who identify as moderate, 
 
3 Approval rating is a continuous scale that runs from 0 to 100%. An approval rating of 0 indicates that the 
work done by this MTurk participant was negatively evaluated by the requester (i.e., researcher) for every 
task they performed. By contrast, an approval rating of 94% indicated that an MTurk participant, on 
average was positively evaluated for every task they participated in. The number of hits means how many 
tasks an MTurk participant has carried out.  
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slightly liberal, liberal, or very liberal as not conservative (0). In the supplementary 
materials, analyses are replicated using a Republican dummy variable.  
This study uses close and open-ended dependent variables (provided in Appendix 
B) to assess responsibility attribution from three key perspectives: motivated reasoning, 
performance information framing and outgroup bias.  
 Our close-ended items account for the range of specific government and non-
government actors participants can assign blame to. The first close-ended item asks 
participants to evaluate the performance of the Trump administration in responding to the 
pandemic on a same scale of 0 (extremely bad) to 10 (extremely good). The second asks 
participants how severe a threat they believe COVID-19 is according to a 0 (completely 
overblown) to 10 (extremely serious) scale. The third set of close-ended items asks 
participants how responsible the Trump administration, Obama administration, the 
Chinese government, Nancy Pelosi, and a range of additional actors frequently mentioned 
by President Trump are for the spread of COVID-19 in the United States. Response 
options ranged from 0 (not responsible at all) to 10 (extremely responsible). The final 
close-ended item evaluates responsibility attribution to different social groups, asking 
participants which ethnic group is most responsible for the spread of the virus across the 
United States. Response options include: Chinese, Hispanic, Black, White/European, and 
Korean. We then collapse these items into a binary variable (1 = Chinese, 0 = non 
Chinese). 
 Relying on close-ended attribution measures alone means we may miss subtle 
ways discriminatory attitudes that arise in response to the presentational strategies we 
examine. Open-ended responses “provide a direct view into the respondent’s own 
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thinking” (Roberts et al. 2017: 1065) and avoid forcing participants to interpret events 
through a lens of pre-constructed categories developed by the researcher. We can 
therefore avoid problems of demand effects and social desirability that often are of a 
concern for close-ended questions. Similarly, Iyengar (1996: 64) writes that open-ended 
questions are beneficial because they “do not cue respondents to think of particular 
causes or treatments.” We therefore include an open-ended item that asks participants to 
share their opinions in 20 characters or more on who they feel has done a bad job in 
responding to the pandemic.  
  
Data Analysis Strategy 
 To examine the effect of political ideology and our treatments on close-ended 
items, we use a series of between-subjects ANOVA. Shapiro-Wilk tests showed that none 
of the closed-ended dependent variables were normally distributed (for all variables: p 
<0.001). To account for this, bias corrected and accelerated bootstrapping with 2000 
replacements from the full sample was used to construct 95% confidence intervals around 
the mean differences (Efron 1987). 
To analyze responses to open-ended items, we use an unsupervised method of text 
analysis referred to as structural topic modeling (STM) (Roberts et al. 2014). As a topic 
model, this semi-automated approach to analyzing textual data “infers” rather than 
“assumes” topics and the basket of words that they consist of (Roberts et al. 2017). A key 
feature of STM is that it allows researchers to estimate topics using text and available 
document metadata, which in our case would be political ideology of the respondent and 
the presentational strategies/manipulations they were exposed to (Roberts et al. 2014). 
 20 
STM, like vanilla topic models, are mixture models which implies that any given 
document can consist of multiple topics. Topics can be understood as distributions of 
word groupings that correspond to a theme. An important goal of STM is to identify “a 
set of shared latent topics across a set of documents and evaluate potential relationships 
between document-level covariates and the prevalence of a given topic” (Bogozzi and 
Berliner 2016).  
To determine the number of topics to extract in small corpora (i.e., “a few 
hundred to a few thousand” documents) we follow the recommendation of Roberts, 
Stewart, and Tingley (2014) and closely examine 5 to 15 topics for interpretability and 
redundancy. Guided by these insights and an empirical analysis of the number of topics 
that best balance semantic coherence of topics with exclusivity, we opted for a five-topic 
structural topic model. Details can be found in the supplementary materials. The results 
of this empirical analysis can be found in the supplementary materials.  
 
Results  
 We present our results, first presenting findings using close-ended data and then 
reporting on responses to open-ended questions to offer a more comprehensive and 
nuanced understanding of the attribution patterns identified.  
Hypothesis 1: Effects of Motivated Reasoning 
 We assess the evidence on motivated reasoning using participants assigned to our 
control group, who were not exposed to the performance framing or scapegoating 
treatments. This group therefore gives both a baseline understanding of how 
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conservatives differ from others in how they view the crisis, and provides a sense of the 
context against which our experimental treatments must be considered.  
H1: Close-ended analysis 
The general pattern of results for close-ended items reveals enormous differences 
in how conservatives and non-conservatives evaluate government performance around 
the same event, offering clear support for Hypothesis 1. In response to the question, 
“How serious of a threat do you think the virus you just read about is? (0 = Completely 
overblown, 10 = Extremely Serious)” conservatives viewed the threat as less serious (see 
Figure 1), rating it 5.9, compared to 7.7 for moderates and liberals (p < 0.001). 
Republicans were also more generous in evaluating “the leadership in the United States 
in responding to this pandemic.” On a 0-10 scale, where 10 is extremely good, 
conservatives averaged 6.3, while moderates and liberals averaged 2.2 (see Figure 1).  
 
 
Figure 1: Perceived severity of COVID-19 and Trump administration performance evaluations among 
conservatives assigned to the baseline group. Vertical lines represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
While conservatives are more supportive of political leadership, 6.3 is not a very 
high score, reflecting some potential misgivings with performance. At the same time, 
conservatives appear more willing to shift blame away from Trump and his 
administration. In a series of questions where we asked which groups were most 
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responsible for the spread of the virus, conservatives differ from other respondents. We 
start with attributions of responsibility toward highly polarized actors that President 
Trump has frequently targeted: former President Obama and the mainstream media 
(Figure 2). Given Obama has been out of office since the beginning of 2017, and the 
media has no role beyond covering the crisis, judging them to be responsible for the 
spread of the disease requires significant motivated reasoning. Asked how responsible 
Obama was for the spread of COVID-19 in the United States, the mean among 
conservatives was 2.5 and for moderates and liberals, 1.1 (p < 0.001). For mass media, 
the mean among conservatives was 5.1 and for moderates and liberals 3.5 (p < 0.001). 
Additionally, conservatives were also more inclined to blame Speaker Pelosi and the 
Chinese government than moderates and liberals. The mean among conservatives for 
Pelosi was 3.9 and for moderates and liberals, 2.1 (p < 0.001). With respect to blaming 
the Chinese government, the mean among conservatives was 7.8 and among moderates 
and liberals, 5.8 (p < 0.001). By contrast, conservatives were less inclined to assign 
blame to President Trump – the mean among conservatives was 4.1 and among 
moderates and liberals, 7.3 (p < 0.001). Conservatives were also more inclined to blame 
the CDC with the mean among conservatives being 5.2 and among moderates and liberals 
4.1 (p < 0.001).  
 
 23 
 
 
Figure 2: Effect of partisan motivated reasoning on blame attribution among participants assigned to the 
baseline group. Vertical lines represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Conservatives are also more apt to blame Chinese residents when provided a list of ethnic 
groups in the United States, and asked which one is the most responsible for the spread of 
the virus. To put the responses in perspective, Asian-Americans as an entire group make 
up less than six percent of Americans, while whites represent more than three-quarters. 
There is no evidence that COVID-19 is more prevalent among Asian-Americans: one 
analysis found that they represented less than five percent of COVID-19 deaths (APM 
Research Labs 2020), while further work indicated that the New York COVID-19 
outbreak had originated in Europe (Zimmer 2020). Based simply on the population size 
differences, the most plausible response is that whites are most responsible for the spread 
of the disease. Nevertheless, 62% of conservatives identified Chinese-Americans as the 
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ethnic group most responsible for the spread of the disease, compared to 30% of non-
conservatives. Interestingly, conservatives were also less likely to blame whites for the 
spread of COVID-19 in the United States when compared to moderates and liberals – just 
34% of conservatives blamed whites compared to 63% of moderates and liberals. The 
large differences between conservatives and non-conservatives in attributing blame to 
ethnic groups implies a potential ceiling effect in our experimental treatments, since the 
non-treated already appears to have internalized attribution patterns consistent with the 
President’s use of the term “Chinese virus.”  
H1: Open-ended analysis 
The open-ended data provides more evidence of motivated reasoning. In response 
to the question of “who did a bad job in responding to the pandemic,” President Trump is 
central to the top two topics. The remaining three topics cite states’ responses and initial 
issues related to confusion and availability of masks. President Trump appears frequently 
in these topics as well. This information is presented in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3: 5 most frequent topic proportions among all participants in the control group for the question Who 
do you think did a bad job responding to the pandemic? Topic prevalence is estimated using the 
conservative variable.  
 
 Figure 4 shows the impact of identifying as a conservative on the chances of a 
participant discussing a particular topic. As with the close-ended items, we observe that 
conservatives are less likely to blame President Trump and more likely to blame other 
actors and causes – namely, states’ responses and confusion surrounding mask wearing 
guidelines and availability. The open-ended responses have the effect of removing 
constraints on the range of actors participants can attribute responsibility to as the close-
ended responses did. Even when doing so, we find no evidence of consensus in the way 
participants from different ideological viewpoints assigned blame. In every single one of 
the five topics most frequently occurring topics, emphasis varied significantly according 
to whether a participant identified as conservative or not. 
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Figure 4: Graphical display of topical prevalence contrast between conservatives and non-conservatives in 
the control group for the question Who do you think did a bad job responding to the pandemic? Horizontal 
lines represent 95% confidence intervals.   
 
Hypotheses 2 and 3: Performance Information Framing as a Presentation Strategy 
 
H2 and 3: Close-ended analysis  
Hypotheses 2 and 3 predicted that performance evaluations of and responsibility 
attribution to the actors in the federal government (e.g., President Trump or the CDC) 
would differ depending on whether participants were assigned to positively or negatively 
framed performance information. Here, we focus on participants who were exposed to 
treatment. These hypotheses do not consider political ideology. The effects of 
performance information framing on evaluations of the Trump administration’s 
performance during the pandemic is above standard levels of statistical significance (F(1, 
1148) = .48, p = 0.49). Additionally, we find no evidence that exposure to performance 
information framing impacted responsibility attribution to the Trump administration (F(1, 
1148) = .004, p = 0.94) or federal agencies charged with responding to the pandemic (i.e., 
the CDC) (F(1, 1148) = 1.12, p = 0.29). These findings are illustrated in Figure 5 below.  
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Figure 5: The impact of performance information framing on performance evaluations of Trump 
administration Performance and Responsibility Attribution to Trump administration and CDC for the 
spread of COVID-19 in the United States for the full sample of participants. Vertical lines represent 95% 
confidence intervals. 
 
 
H2 and H3: Open-ended analysis 
 The open-ended responses provide a slightly different perspective on how 
exposure to performance information framing impacts blame attribution. Results of the 
five most frequent topics, shown below in Figure 6, point to a diverse set of actors  that 
appears to split along partisan lines – the two most frequent topics related to the federal 
government’s response and President Trump, and the remaining three highlight issues 
with Democrats’ role in the economic downturn, masks, and state governments.  
  
Figure 6: 5 most frequent topic proportions among all participants for the question Who do you think did a 
bad job responding to the pandemic? Topic prevalence is estimated using the performance information 
framing variable.  
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Figure 7 shows the impact of exposure to negatively versus positively framed 
performance information on the frequency with which a particular topic is discussed. In 
contrast to the close-ended items, we see that the frequency with which a topic is 
discussed varies significantly according to whether participants were exposed to 
negatively or positively framed performance information for two key topics – blame 
assigned to the federal government and to Democrats’ role in the economic downturn. 
Specifically, when compared to participants exposed to positively framed performance 
information, those exposed to negatively framed performance information were 
significantly more likely to blame Democrats for their role in the economic downturn, 
and significantly less likely to assign blame to the federal government’s response to the 
pandemic. Blaming Democrats for the economic downturn may reflect decisions over 
whether to open or close the economy in response to the pandemic, with Democrats 
generally advocating for closures and Republicans advocating to remain open. While we 
observe a significant impact of performance information framing on blame attribution for 
the federal government, there is no significant impact on blame attribution to the 
president. This is interesting in that it alludes to a level of nuance in the way exposure to 
negatively framing performance information, as a presentation strategy, impacts 
responsibility attribution.  
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Figure 7: Graphical display of topical prevalence contrast between exposure to positively and negatively 
framed performance information among all participants for responses to the question Who do you think did 
a bad job responding to the pandemic? Horizontal lines represent 95% confidence intervals.   
 
Hypothesis 4: Partisan Motivated Reasoning and Performance Information Framing 
H4: Close-ended analysis 
Hypothesis 4 predicted that conservatives exposed to the negatively framed 
performance information would be more inclined to blame actors outside of the United 
States federal government when compared to those exposed to positively framed 
performance information. In other words, exposure to negatively framed performance 
information would trigger blame shifting among conservatives. Responses to close-ended 
items do not offer support for this prediction. Focusing on frequent targets of the Trump 
administration, we find no significant difference among conservative participants 
assigned to positively and negatively framed performance information in their 
responsibility attributions to former President Obama (F(1, 341) = 1.80, p = 0.18), 
Congresswoman Pelosi (F(1, 341) = 2.86, p = 0.09), the Chinese government (F(1, 341) = 
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1.13, p = 0.28), and mass media (F(1, 341) = 0.920, p = 0.33). Differences across 
treatment groups are illustrated below in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8: The impact of performance information framing on responsibility attribution to the Obama 
Administration, Speaker Pelosi, the Chinese government, and the mass media for the spread of COVID-19 
in the United States among conservatives. Vertical lines represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
H4: Open-ended analysis 
For conservative participants, responses to open-ended responses provide a 
broader view on the impact of performance information framing on blame attribution. 
The five most frequently mentioned topics, shown in Figure 9, among conservatives, 
clearly echo President Trump’s speaking points. The three topics participants most 
frequently assigned blame to were Democrats, governors, and the “liberal left.” 
Following this, the remaining two topics, which appear much less frequently than the top 
three topics, include the President’s response and a generic ‘administration’ category.  
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Figure 9: Most frequent topic proportions among conservatives for the question Who do you think did a bad 
job responding to the pandemic? In estimating these topics, prevalence is estimated using the performance 
information framing variable. 
 
Figure 10 illustrates how topic prevalence varies according to performance 
information framing among conservative participants. Here again we observe significant 
variation that results from exposure to performance information framing. However, this 
variation demonstrates that exposure to negatively framed performance information did 
not have a standard effect, but relatively nuanced attributional reasoning. When given 
negative information, conservatives do not become more likely to blame the Trump 
administration, as with the close-ended responses. But they do become more likely to 
seek to blame, and their ire is directed toward a diverse bipartisan set of actors – state 
governors – and the abstract concept of partisanship. Thus, this presentational strategy 
appears to shield the Trump administration from the blame arising from bad news. When 
provided a positive frame, conservatives are more willing to blame partisan targets of 
President Trump’s criticisms - Democrats and the liberal left. Here, it may be that the 
good news of the positive frame causes conservatives to punish actors they believe have 
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been too critical of the Trump administration. Cumulatively, these findings offer some 
support for Hypothesis 4, with the qualification that exposure to framing operates in more 
nuanced ways than established by the close-ended categories. Frames did increase blame 
shifting by conservatives, in a way that generally protected the Trump administration, 
even as positive and negative frames were processed differently to assign blame to 
different actors.  
  
Figure 10: Graphical display of topical prevalence contrast between exposure to positively and negatively 
framed performance information among conservatives for responses to the question Who do you think did a 
bad job responding to the pandemic? Horizontal lines represent 95% confidence intervals.  
 
Hypothesis 5: Effects of Scapegoating as a Presentational Strategy  
 
H5: Close-ended analysis 
We first examine the impact of the scapegoat trigger on assigning blame for the 
spread of COVID-19 in the United States to the Chinese government and Chinese 
residents for the entire sample (H5). Participants exposed to the scapegoat cue –  Chinese 
virus – when communicating performance information were more inclined to blame 
Chinese residents for the spread of COVID-19 in the United States when compared to 
those who were not exposed to the scapegoat cue (i.e., the term COVID-19) (F(1, 1150) = 
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6.39, p = 0.012). Conversely, there was no difference in blame assigned to the Chinese 
government across treatment groups (F(1, 1150) = 0.305, p = 0.58). These results are 
illustrated in Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11: The impact of racial scapegoat trigger on assigning blame for the spread of COVID-19 in the 
United States to Chinese residents and the Chinese government for the full sample. Vertical lines represent 
95% confidence intervals. 
 
H5: Open-ended analysis 
 Open-ended responses again broaden our understanding of how people respond to 
scapegoating. Here, we find that the scapegoating presentational strategy directs blame 
towards the person who pushed the term: President Trump and the federal government. 
The remaining three most prevalent topics center on Democrats and the economic 
downturn, mask debates, and a more generic category blaming government in general. 
The topics, along with the prevalence are reported in Figure 12. 
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 Figure 12: 5 most frequent topic proportions among participants assigned to the Chinese virus and 
COVID-19 treatment for the question Who do you think did a bad job responding to the pandemic? In 
estimating topics, prevalence is estimated using the scapegoat treatment variable.    
 
Additionally, we observe variation in the prevalence of these topics attributable to 
exposure to the scapegoat cue. Specifically, as illustrated in Figure 13, participants 
exposed to the term “Chinese virus” were significantly more likely to direct attention to 
President Trump. Conversely, this group was less likely to discuss the mask debate than 
participants exposed to the term COVID-19. Interestingly, while we find an effect of the 
cue on blaming President Trump, we do not find any impact on blaming the federal 
government. This suggests that the use of the term “Chinese virus,” and consequent 
resentment, is more closely linked to President Trump than his administration.  
It appears that, when prompted by response options in close-ended items, 
participants will cite Chinese residents when attributing blame. However, when this 
prompt is absent, exposure to the scapegoat cue tends to focus the assignment of blame 
on the President. Of note, the term ‘Chinese’ was not included in any of the 5 most 
prevalent topics. One way of interpreting these findings is that the use of the term 
“Chinese virus” creates a situation where participants not only blame Chinese residents 
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for the spread of the virus in the United States, but also the actor(s) that make use of the 
term. 
  
Figure 13: Graphical display of topical prevalence contrast between participants exposed to the term 
Chinese virus and COVID-19 for the question Who do you think did a bad job responding to the pandemic? 
Horizontal lines represent 95% confidence intervals.   
 
Hypothesis 6: Effects of Scapegoat Cue and Partisan Motivated Reasoning 
 
H6: Close-ended analysis 
For conservative respondents we find no main effect of exposure to the term 
“Chinese virus”  on blame assigned to Chinese residents (F(1, 341) = 0.1.63, p = 0.202) 
or the Chinese government (F(1, 341) = 0.045, p = 0.83). Additionally, we find the effect 
of the scapegoat cue does not vary significantly according to political ideology for blame 
assigned to Chinese residents (F(1, 1148) = 0.002, p = 0.96) or the Chinese government 
(F(1, 1148) = 0.506, p = 0.47). The interaction effects are illustrated in Figure 14 below. 
This may simply reflect the fact that, as noted above, conservatives already have a higher 
base propensity to blame Chinese residents, perhaps because they have internalized the 
repeated framing efforts of the Trump administration, or because conservatives hold a 
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more critical view towards outgroups and immigrants generally. We therefore probe the 
responses of conservatives to the scapegoat trigger in greater detail below, using both 
close-ended and open-ended responses.  
 
Figure 14: The impact of racial scapegoat trigger on assigning blame for the spread of COVID-19 in the 
United States to Chinese residents and the Chinese government for conservatives. Vertical lines represent 
95% confidence intervals. 
 
 If the scapegoat cue does not increase blame to Chinese residents for 
conservatives, might it affect other forms of outgroup bias and blame among 
conservatives? We find some evidence of this, with conservatives becoming more likely 
to attribute responsibility to former President Obama and Speaker Pelosi when exposed to 
the Chinese virus cue (for Obama: F(1, 1148) = 8.25, p = 0.004; For Pelosi: F(1, 1148) = 
7.77, p = 0.005). Figure 15 demonstrates these differences and also shows that exposure 
to the scapegoat trigger reduces assignment of blame to Obama and Pelosi among 
moderates and liberals.  
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Figure 15: The impact of racial scapegoat trigger on assigning blame for the spread of COVID-19 in the 
United States to Obama and Pelosi according to whether a participant is conservative or not. Horizontal 
lines represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
H6: Open-ended analysis 
 The open-ended responses provide additional nuance to our understanding of how 
conservatives respond to the Chinese Virus cue. Figure 16 provides a five-topic structural 
topic model for conservatives exposed to the trigger. The most frequent topic was 
‘everyone but the President’ – participants assign blame to a number of actors, including 
the media, the public, and state government, but fail to specifically mention actors in the 
federal government, such as President Trump or the CDC. Following this, in terms of 
decreasing frequency, participants blamed states’ responses, President Trump’s response, 
government in general, and the President’s leadership. Of note is that two of the five 
topic models directly address concerns over President Trump’s handling of the pandemic 
– a more personalized category calling out President Trump in particular, and a second 
the emphasizes the Office of the President and his administration. While topic prevelance 
indicates Trump does not figure prominently in the list of actors that conservatives blame 
for the United States’ response to the pandemic, neither is he absolved from blame. A 
further observation is that, while President Trump frequently attempted to shift blame to 
prominent Democrats and China, they are not mentioned at all in topics.  
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Figure 16: 5 most frequent topic proportions among conservative participants assigned to the Chinese virus 
and COVID-19 treatment for the question Who do you think did a bad job responding to the pandemic? In 
estimating these topics, prevalence is estimated using the scapegoat variable.    
 
The idea that conservative participants do not completely absolve President 
Trump from blame comports with variation observed in the prevalence of topics 
attributable to exposure to the scapegoat cue. Here, we find some evidence of a backlash. 
Specifically, as demonstrated in Figure 17, exposing conservative participants to the term 
“Chinese virus” actually increased blame for Trump’s response to the pandemic, and 
reduced the assignment of blame to state governments.  
Taken together, the evidence suggests that the effect of a scapegoat cue as a 
presentation strategy was mixed for President Trump. It may partially deflect blame to 
Democrats, but does not increase blame toward Chinese residents or the Chinese 
government, and also actually invites it for Trump. One potential reason for this is that 
the term is so closely associated with Trump that merely mentioning it creates an 
association in the minds of subjects between Trump and the pandemic. Another 
possibility is that conservatives are more sensitive to international threats, and that the 
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term “Chinese virus” triggers them to blame federal actors – not just Trump but also 
Pelosi and Obama – for failing to protect the borders, a failing not viewed as the 
responsibility of state officials.  
  
Figure 17: Graphical display of topical prevalence contrast between conservatives exposed to the term 
Chinese virus and COVID-19 for the question Who do you think did a bad job responding to the pandemic? 
Horizontal lines represent 95% confidence intervals.   
 
Discussion 
 
 The results of the survey experiment and structural topic models provide some 
clear findings. We see large differences between conservatives and others in how they 
interpret the crisis. Conservatives are less likely to see a pandemic that arose under a 
Republican President as a serious threat, more likely to believe the Trump administration 
is doing a good job, and to blame the targets of President Trump’s blame-shifting efforts: 
current and former Democratic politicians, the media, and the Chinese government. The 
results are a powerful example of partisan motivated reasoning in shaping how the public 
understands government performance and allocates blame as a result. The open-ended 
responses suggest some agreement about the cast of actors that non-conservatives and 
conservatives blame for the response to the pandemic, highlighting President Trump and 
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state governments. Thus, a key point of distinction lies in the degree of blame placed on 
the different actors. 
 Second, we find evidence that the use of scapegoat cues matters. While the intent 
of the term “Chinese virus” is ambiguous – is it a racial cue or nationalistic cue? – the 
effects in our sample are not: Chinese residents face additional blame, but the Chinese 
government does not. While the intent of the Trump administration was to redirect blame 
towards the Chinese government, our findings suggest this effort failed. It is important to 
note here that the estimates of the scapegoat treatment are likely conservative: since the 
term was in frequent use by the President, many had already been exposed to it, and had 
already internalized the effect. This makes the increased blame assigned to East Asian 
and in particular Chinese Americans as a result of the use of the term all the more 
worrying. Invoking scapegoat triggers in a diverse society has a predictable effect of 
making some members of that society the target for blame. Apart from the basic need for 
cross-group tolerance in a democracy, the scapegoating of one group undermines the 
sense of collective effort needed for the public to co-produce the collective action needed 
to defeat a pandemic. Our results also suggest that while scapegoat cues might trigger 
blame toward those groups, it does not necessarily follow that the blame allocated to 
government declines as a result. When using the full sample, and when focusing on 
conservatives, our findings show that the use of such divisive language causes unease, 
and even increases blaming toward Trump. As an exercise in blame avoidance, the use of 
scapegoat triggers is risky: they create blame toward the outgroup, but may also do the 
same for the blamer.  
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 Our evidence that efforts to spin performance information using equivalence 
framing made a difference to the judgments of our respondents is mixed. Close-ended 
responses, provide no evidence of a significant effect of performance information 
framing on blaming the specific actors and institutions listed in our response options. 
Equivalence testing allows us to accept the null hypothesis of no difference in 
performance evaluations between the negative and positive performance information 
treatment groups for hypotheses 2 and 3.  
On the other hand, findings from the open-ended responses demonstrate a 
significant effect of performance information framing on blame attribution that close-
ended items were unable to capture. Analyses using the full sample, and a subsample of 
conservatives indicate participants use negatively framed performance information to 
punish some actors, and positively framed performance information to blame others, and 
these patterns depend upon how motivated reasoning aligns those actors as enemies of 
the President (blamed when the framing is positive) or more abstract and bipartisan 
targets (blamed when the framing is negative). This finding is novel in that it extends 
prior work showing a negativity bias in the way individuals respond to performance 
information (James and Mosely 2014; Nielsen and Moynihan 2017; Olsen 2015; Van 
Bekerom, van der Voet, and Christensen 2020). Our findings extend this line of work, 
showing that participants appear to respond to both negatively and positively framed 
performance information, although in different ways. From this perspective, responses to 
performance information may be more sophisticated than previous research has implied.  
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Conclusion 
 
 Highly visible and salient crises have an outsize effect on how the public judges 
the quality of government. While public actors can try to shape that evaluation through 
skillful management of the event itself, they also devote significant attention to managing 
perceptions of the event by employing different presentational strategies (Hood 2010; 
Weaver 1986). Our findings suggest the limited power political leaders have, and 
significant risks they face, during an enormous crisis. Conditions of polarization may 
partially shield public actors, but also ensure some blame, and their own presentational 
blame avoidance strategies may backfire or be rendered ineffective. 
 An obvious limitation of our analysis is that it examines only perceptions of 
blame attribution in one country during a global pandemic. The particular conditions of 
the US setting – a generally poor response, intense polarization, and a President engaged 
in intense blame avoidance strategies – make it both ideal to analyze the variables we 
study, but also mark it as distinct from other countries. An obvious extension of our 
findings would be to examine how the public evaluates government performance when 
those conditions are less present.  
One theoretical implication is that our findings help to build upon existing efforts 
to understand the implications of equivalence framing interacts with motivated reasoning 
to shape responses to performance information. The non-significant effects on close-
ended responses may speak to boundary conditions for the role of equivalence framing in 
evaluating performance information, and suggest it may have a less marked impact in 
situations where respondents have strong political priors about the topic (see also 
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Damgaard and Nielsen 2019). But we also show that standard analyses that use only 
close-ended indicators may miss other effects of the framing of performance information.  
Just as prior work observes motivated reasoning in the processing of performance 
information (e.g., Van den Bekerom, van der Voet, and Christensen 2020), we extend this 
work, focusing on the effects of performance framing in a highly political context. The 
open-ended responses show respondents interpret the framing of information in creative 
ways that largely protects the partisan official they identify with. As the setting we focus 
on is unique, future research can extend these findings by examining whether a similar 
pattern of effects translates to other highly politized contexts. Future work could 
therefore do more to vary the conditions under which equivalence and other sorts of 
performance information framing is provided, using more realistic scenarios to gauge the 
strength of the frame relative to other factors such as user beliefs or factors such as 
political knowledge. 
A final theoretical implication of our findings relates to the impact of scapegoat 
cues, such as the term Chinese Virus, on blame attribution. While research on blame 
attribution in public management is not new, extant research on determinants has largely 
been limited to partisanship. Noting the role of outgroup bias in shaping the assignment 
of blame, we extend this body of research by illustrating how, in the context of co-
produced public goods, outgroup cues can trigger scapegoating of minority groups. 
However, one limitation of this strategy is that is focuses on a very idiosyncratic context 
– the last pandemic to hit the United States was in 1968 (CDC 2020). Future research 
could extend these findings by exploring how the use of similar scapegoat cues impact 
blame attribution in common public service settings, such as education.  
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Appendix A: Vignettes 
Baseline 
The Trump administration is dealing with the challenge of testing residents for a new 
and potentially dangerous virus. These days the performance of the Trump 
administration's performance is frequently discussed 
 
2x2 Treatment combines COVID-19 or Chinese virus with Positive and Negative 
Frame 
The Trump administration is dealing with the challenge of testing residents for a virus 
it has referred to as COVID-19 [neutral description]/Chinese virus [scapegoat cue]. 
These days the Trump administration's performance is frequently discussed. Currently, 
the Trump administration is struggling to test people for COVID-19. The Trump 
administration estimates the United States will [positive equivalence frame]/will not 
[negative equivalence frame] have enough COVID-19 tests for [random number 
between 51-99 for positive frame/1-49 for negative frame] percent of people seeking 
tests in the next 10 days.  
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Appendix B: Dependent Variables 
Close-ended 
How would you evaluate the performance of the Trump administration in responding 
to this pandemic? (0 = Extremely Bad; 10 = Extremely Good) 
 
How serious of a threat do you think the virus you just read about is? (0 = Completely  
overblown, 10 = Extremely Serious) 
 
How responsible is each of the entities below for the spread of the virus you just read 
about in the United States? (0 = Not responsible at all; 10 = Extremely responsible) 
Items: The Trump administration; the Obama administration; the Chinese government 
 
How responsible is each of the entities below for the spread of the virus you just read 
about in the United States? (0 = Not responsible at all; 10 = Extremely responsible) 
Items: Nancy Pelosi; State Governors; the mainstream media; the Centers for Disease 
Control 
 
What ethnic group is most responsible for the spread of the virus you just read about in 
the United States 
Select from: Chinese/Hispanic/Black/White/Korean 
 
Open-ended 
 
In the United States, who has done a bad job responding to the pandemic? Why? 
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Section 1) Balance Test and Summary Statistics 
 
Control 
n = 287 
Positively Framed 
Data 
n = 566 
Negatively Framed Data 
n = 586 
χ2/df, 
p Value 
 
Chinese Virus 
n = 579 
COVID-19 
n = 573 
χ2/df, 
p Value 
 
Gender%  
 Female 46.34 48.23 46.49 1.603/4, p = .808 45.89 47.15 .682/4, p = .954 
Ethnicity%  
American Indian .36 0.512 0.707 
6.43/12, 
p = .893 
0.518 0.698 
7.98/12, p = .787 
Asian 6.97 9.556 9.894 9.672 9.773 
Black or African American 9.76 12.116 12.544 12.09 12.565 
Hispanic 4.87 4.437 4.417 5.181 3.665 
Native Hawaiian .35 0.341 0.353 0.173 0.524 
Other 1.74 2.048 1.06 1.9 1.222 
White 75.95 70.99 71.025 70.466 71.553 
Age (mean)  
 40.891 40.654 40.285 123.8/124, p = .486 40.057 40.880 
106.46/124, 
p = .870 
Income %  
$10,000 - $19,999 7.666 7.244 5.802 
34.66/22, 
p = .04 
5.354 7.679 
36.70/22, p = 0.03 
$100,000 - $149,999 10.453 11.484 11.433 12.263 10.646 
$20,000 - $29,999 13.24 10.424 8.532 8.636 10.297 
$30,000 - $39,999 11.847 12.191 10.58 11.917 10.82 
$40,000 - $49,999 8.014 11.661 11.775 12.09 11.344 
$50,000 - $59,999 9.756 10.777 12.628 12.781 10.646 
$60,000 - $69,999 11.15 7.597 7.679 9.154 6.108 
$70,000 - $79,999 8.014 6.007 10.41 6.736 9.773 
$80,000 - $89,999 4.53 6.537 4.949 5.181 6.283 
$90,000 - $99,999 4.53 6.36 7.85 5.699 8.551 
Less than $10,000 5.923 4.24 2.218 3.454 2.967 
More than $150,000 4.878 5.477 6.143 6.736 4.887 
Political Affiliation %  
Democrat 44.948 40.813 46.075 
10.72/6, p = .09 
43.523 43.455 
9.465/6, p = .149 Independent 32.056 28.622 24.573 25.216 27.923 Other 2.091 3.887 3.413 4.318 2.967 
Republican 20.906 26.678 25.939 26.943 25.654 
Education %  
2 year degree 11.498 10.601 11.945 
8.52/10, p = .578 
11.917 10.646 
4.05/10, p = .945 
4 year degree 43.902 46.113 44.881 43.523 47.469 
Graduate degree 17.77 16.784 19.795 18.48 18.15 
High school graduate 8.362 8.834 9.044 9.154 8.726 
Less than high school 0.348 0.707 0 0.518 0.175 
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Section 2) Results controlling for income 
 H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H6 
Severity F(1, 285) = 21.43, p < 0.000 - - - - - 
Perceptions of 
Trump’s 
Performance 
F(1, 285) = 90.52, p 
< 0.000 
F(1, 1128) = 0.08, 
p = 0.778 - - - - 
Blame Obama F(1, 285) = 11.64, p < 0.000 - - 
F(1, 341) = 1.76, p = 
0.196 - 
F(1, 1104) = 6.67, p 
= 0.01 
Blame Media F(1, 285) = 9.34, p = 0.002 - - 
F(1, 341) = 1.029, p 
= 0.311 - - 
Blame Chinese 
Government 
F(1, 285) = 14.39, p 
< 0.000 - - 
F(1, 341) = 0.634, p 
= 0.426 
F(1, 1128) = 0.477, p 
= 0.489 
F(1, 1104) = 0.11, p 
= 0.74 
Blame Pelosi F(1, 285) = 9.45, p = 0.002 - - 
F(1, 341) = 1.521, p 
= 0.218 - 
F(1, 1104) = 5.23, p 
= 0.02 
Blame Trump F(1, 285) = 51.29, p < 0.000 - 
F(1, 1128) = 0.07, 
p = 0.792 - - - 
Blame CDC F(1, 285) = 2.82, p = 0.09 - 
F(1, 1150) = 1.01, 
p = 0.316 - - - 
Blame Chinese 
Residents 
F(1, 285) = 12.81 p < 
0.000 - - - 
F(1, 1128) = 6.29, p 
= 0.012 
F(1, 1148) = 0.81, p 
= 0.36 
H1: Motivated reasoning will lead to differences in how conservatives and non-conservatives assess the severity of the crisis, assess the performance of political 
leadership, and allocate responsibility to actors inside and outside of the United States Federal government.  
H2: Exposure to negatively framed performance data will trigger more negative performance evaluations of actors in the United States federal government than 
exposure to positively framed performance data.  
H3: Exposure to negatively framed performance data will trigger greater responsibility attribution to actors in the United States federal government than 
exposure to equivalent positively framed public health performance data. 
H4: Conservatives exposed to the negatively framed performance information will be more likely to blame actors outside of the United States federal government 
when compared to those exposed to positively framed performance information. 
H5: Participants exposed to the term 'Chinese virus' will be more inclined to blame Chinese residents and the Chinese government when compared to 
participants exposed to the term 'COVID - 19.' 
H6: The effect of the “Chinese virus” framing on blaming Chinese residents and the Chinese government will be greatest for conservatives.
 4 
Section 3) Results for two-one sided t-tests (Equivalence testing) for the Effect of Performance Data Framing 
In this section we provide the results of equivalence tests for H2, H3, and H4 using two one-sided hypothesis 
tests using the TOSTER R package (Lakens 2017). In TOST equivalence testing, two independent t-tests are used to 
evaluate whether an effect differs significantly from equivalence bounds (or equivalence margin) that are equal to the 
smallest effect size of interest. Specifically, one t-test is used to examine whether an estimated effect differs 
significantly from the upper equivalence bound and a second to see whether the effect differs from the lower 
equivalence bound. If an effect falls within the upper and lower equivalence bounds (i.e., it is significantly smaller 
than the upper and significantly larger than the lower equivalence bound), we can accept the null hypothesis that an 
observed effect is too small to matter. If an effect falls within the upper or lower equivalence bounds (i.e., it is not 
significantly different from the upper or lower equivalence bound), we can reject the null, but not accept it (i.e., not 
conclude that the effect is too small to matter). 
 For the figures below, we use equivalence bounds based on a small effect (Cohen’s D = .2). A null hypothesis 
significance test at .05% corresponds to a 90% confidence interval for TOST, whereas a 95% confidence interval for 
TOST corresponds to a null hypothesis significance test at 0.025%. 
Reference 
 
Lakens, Daniël. 2017. Equivalence tests: A practical primer for t tests, correlations, and meta-analyses.  Social 
Psychological and Personality Science 8:355-362. 
 
 5 
 H2 H3 H4 
Perceptions of Trump’s 
Performance 
TOST Upper: p = 0.045 
TOST Lower: p = 0.001 
90% CI: -0.196, 0.472 
- - 
Blame Obama - - 
TOST Upper: p = 0.304 
TOST Lower: p < 0.000 
90% CI: -0.116, 1.13 
Blame Media - - 
TOST Upper: p = 0.186 
TOST Lower: p = 0.003 
90% CI: -0.261, 0.987 
Blame Chinese Government - - 
TOST Upper: p = 0.2157 
TOST Lower: p = 0.002 
90% CI: -0.189, 0.875 
Blame Pelosi - - 
TOST Upper: p = 0.436 
TOST Lower: p < 0.000 
90% CI: 0.017, 1.31 
Blame Trump - 
TOST Upper: p < 0.000 
TOST Lower: p < 0.000 
90% CI: -0.306, 0.334 
- 
Blame CDC - 
TOST Upper: p = 0.001 
TOST Lower: p < 0.001 
90% CI: -0.116, 0.536 
- 
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Section 4) Structural topic model fit statistics 
 
As was explained in the main text, we selected a 5 topic topic-model, in part because of the relatively small corpus we use (Roberts, Stewart, and Tingley 2014). 
Additionally, a qualitative assessment of the words associated with each topic also indicated the basket of words for 5 topic topic-models was more coherent 
when compared to alternative 6 and 10 topic specifications. To add a more objective assessment of the number of topics to include in our structural topic models, 
we follow Bogozzi and Berliner (2016) and use model diagnostics as a piece of secondary, objective evidence in our evaluation. Specifically, to offer further 
rationale into the decision to use 5 topics, as opposed to, for example, 7 or 10 topic models, we quantitatively evaluate model fit diagnostics related to coherence 
and semantic cohesion. Semantic cohesion is an average that quantifies the degree to which words in each topic - across n topics – relate to one another. 
Exclusivity reflects the degree to which the words in one topic are not present in other topics for a given structural topic model. In other words, this metric 
quantifies how distinct each topic is. Because semantic coherence and exclusivity vary in relation to the number of topics included in a structural topic model, the 
optimal number of topics reflects the number that scores highest in terms of semantic coherence and exclusivity. Below we report semantic coherence and 
exclusivity for 5, 7, and 10 topic models. As can be seen, in most cases the metrics favor a 5 topic structural topic model. In instances where the data suggest an 
alternative number of topics is optimal, the difference when compared to a 5 topic model is marginal. Results are provided below. 
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Semantic Coherence and Exclusivity for Structural Topic model used for Hypothesis 1 
 Semantic Coherence Exclusivity 
5 topic STM -67.68 6.99 
7 topic STM -67.95 6.83 
10 topic STM -86.87 6.33 
 
Semantic Coherence and Exclusivity for Structural Topic model used for Hypotheses 2 and 3 
 Semantic Coherence Exclusivity 
5 topic STM -141.48 9.19 
7 topic STM -157.34 9.36 
10 topic STM -139.96 9.39 
 
Semantic Coherence and Exclusivity for Structural Topic model used for Hypotheses 4 
 Semantic Coherence Exclusivity 
5 topic STM -119.17 7.18 
7 topic STM -127.73 7.19 
10 topic STM -126.84 6.61 
 
Semantic Coherence and Exclusivity for Structural Topic model used for Hypotheses 5 
 Semantic Coherence Exclusivity 
5 topic STM -146.24 9.20 
7 topic STM -150.14 9.35 
10 topic STM -146.89 9.39 
 
Semantic Coherence and Exclusivity for Structural Topic model used for Hypotheses 6 
 Semantic Coherence Exclusivity 
5 topic STM -117.50 7.18 
7 topic STM -127.74 7.18 
10 topic STM -127.47 6.62 
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Section 5) Top 15 words for every topic in each topic model calculated using FREX 
Hypothesis 1 
Topic Number 15 top words  
1: President Response: General peopl, presid, virus, feder, trump, mask, job, pandem, respond, wear, state, bad, donald, govern, governor 
2: Mask Confusion job, donald, presid, pandem, mask, peopl, virus, state, wear, respond, trump, bad, feder, govern, governor 
3: States’ Response pandem, state, respond, governor, presid, job, peopl, trump, virus, mask, wear, bad, donald, feder, govern 
4: Mask Debate govern, mask, wear, presid, virus, trump, job, peopl, pandem, state, respond, bad, donald, feder, governor 
5: President Response: Negative trump, bad, presid, pandem, job, mask, virus, respond, peopl, wear, state, donald, feder, govern, governor 
Hypotheses 2 and 3 
Topic Number 15 top words  
1: President’s Response administr, peopl, donald, virus, spread, make, test, covid-19, time, terribl, slow, downplay, sever, follow, horribl 
2: Federal Government Response job, bad, respond, pandem, feder, presid, poor, inform, media, situat, offici, local, horribl, act, terribl 
3:Democrats and Economic Downturn economi, countri, distanc, trump, care, democrat, number, live, health, reopen, citizen, lie, governor, act, leader 
4: State Government thing, social, govern, respons, good, made, polit, death, local, leadership, home, rule, american, blame, provid 
5: Mask Debate mask, wear, state, public, governor, refus, open, case, unit, cdc, earli, action, busi, close, fail 
Hypothesis 4 
Topic Number 15 top words  
1: Administration pandem, administr, respond, virus, bad, spread, mask, presid, peopl, democrat, govern, state, governor, job, media 
2: Liberal Left bad, democrat, media, govern, spread, respond, state, peopl, mask, virus, pandem, presid, administr, governor, job 
3: Democrat’s Response job, state, govern, respond, spread, democrat, peopl, mask, virus, pandem, bad, presid, administr, governor, media 
4: Governors’ Response peopl, virus, governor, mask, state, govern, spread, democrat, bad, respond, pandem, presid, administr, job, media 
5: Partisanship trump, presid, virus, state, democrat, pandem, peopl, respond, mask, spread, bad, govern, administr, governor, job 
Hypothesis 5 
Topic Number 15 top words  
1: President’s Response administr, donald, peopl, virus, spread, make, covid-19, time, test, downplay, slow, terribl, sever, follow, horribl 
2: Federal Gov’s Response job, bad, respond, feder, pandem, presid, media, poor, inform, offici, situat, act, local, horribl, test 
3: Democrats and Economic Downturn economi, distanc, countri, care, democrat, trump, governor, number, live, health, reopen, lie, citizen, leader, ignor 
4: Government in General social, thing, made, govern, good, respons, polit, local, home, death, leadership, rule, american, blame, provid 
5: Mask Debate mask, wear, state, refus, public, open, unit, case, cdc, action, earli, busi, close, fail, governor 
Hypothesis 6 
Topic Number 15 top words  
1: President’s Response president, administration, virus, people, pandemic, states, government, media, bad, job, state, trump 
2: Everyone but the President people, bad, media, pandemic, states, virus, government, president, administration, job, state, trump 
3: States’ Response job, pandemic, states, people, media, virus, government, president, administration, bad, state, trump 
4: Trump’s Response trump, virus, people, states, pandemic, media, government, president, administration, bad, job, state 
5: Government in General government, state, people, media, states, president, pandemic, virus, administration, bad, job, trump 
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Section 6) Results using partisan affiliation (Republican) instead of partisan ideology (conservative) 
 H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H6 
Severity F(1, 285) = 7.88, p < 0.005 - - - - - 
Perceptions of 
Trump’s 
Performance 
F(1, 285) = 86.10, p 
< 0.000 
F(1, 1148) = 0.48, 
p = 0.496 - - - - 
Blame Obama F(1, 285) = 24.5, p < 0.000 - - 
F(1, 301) = 1.29, p = 
0.257 - 
F(1, 301) = 0.46, p = 
0.498 
Blame Media F(1, 285) = 16.3, p < 0.001 - - 
F(1, 301) = 1.30, p = 
0.255 - - 
Blame Chinese 
Government 
F(1, 285) = 27.5, p < 
0.000 - - 
F(1, 301) = 0.379, p 
= 0.539 
F(1, 1148) = 0.334, p 
= 0.563 
F(1, 301) = 0.289, p 
= 0.59 
Blame Pelosi F(1, 285) = 19.00, p <0.000 - - 
F(1, 301) = 4.70, p = 
0.03 - 
F(1, 301) = 0.608, p 
= 0.436 
Blame Trump F(1, 285) = 30.10, p < 0.000 - 
F(1, 1148) = 0.004, 
p = 0.948 - - - 
Blame CDC F(1, 285) = 7.78, p = 0.005 - 
F(1, 1148) = 1.11, 
p = 0.291 - - - 
Blame Chinese 
Residents 
F(1, 285) = 27.3, p < 
0.000 - - - 
F(1, 1148) = 6.40, p 
= 0.012 
F(1, 301) = 0.205, p 
= 0.65 
H1: Motivated reasoning will lead to differences in how Republicans and non Republicans assess the severity of the crisis, assess the performance of political 
leadership, and allocate responsibility to actors inside and outside of the United States Federal government.  
H2: Exposure to negatively framed performance data will trigger more negative performance evaluations of actors in the United States federal government than 
exposure to positively framed performance data.  
H3: Exposure to negatively framed performance data will trigger greater responsibility attribution to actors in the United States federal government than 
exposure to equivalent positively framed public health performance data. 
H4: Republicans exposed to the negatively framed performance information will be more likely to blame actors outside of the United States federal government 
when compared to those exposed to positively framed performance information. 
H5: Participants exposed to the term 'Chinese virus' will be more inclined to blame Chinese residents and the Chinese government when compared to 
participants exposed to the term 'COVID - 19.' 
H6: The effect of the “Chinese virus” framing on blaming Chinese residents and the Chinese government will be greatest for Republicans.
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Results using partisan affiliation (Republican) instead of partisan ideology (conservative) for open-ended items.  
 
 
H1: Motivated reasoning will lead to differences in how Republicans and non Republicans assess the severity of the crisis, assess the performance of political 
leadership, and allocate responsibility to actors inside and outside of the United States Federal government.  
 
For hypothesis 1, topics, topic prevalence, and variation attributable to partisan affiliation does not vary substantively from the results in the main text.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1a: 5 Most frequent topic proportions among all participants in the control group for the question Who do you think did a bad job responding to the 
pandemic? 
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Figure 1b: Graphical display of topical prevalence contrast between Republicans and non-Republicans in the control group for the question Who do you think did 
a bad job responding to the pandemic? Horizontal lines represent 95% confidence intervals.   
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H4: Exposure to negatively framed performance data will trigger more negative performance evaluations of actors in the United States federal government than 
exposure to positively framed performance data.  
 
While the specific names of the topics differ from those in the main text, as well their prevalence results in 2b shows the pattern of effects that results from 
exposure to performance information framing on blame attribution correspond to the results reported in the main text. 
 
  
Figure 2a: Most frequent topic proportions among Republicans for the question Who do you think did a bad job responding to the pandemic? In estimating these 
topics, prevalence is estimated using exposure to performance information framing.    
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Figure 2b: Graphical display of topical prevalence contrast between exposure to positively and negatively framed performance information among Republicans 
for responses to the question Who do you think did a bad job responding to the pandemic? Horizontal lines represent 95% confidence intervals.  
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H6: The effect of the “Chinese virus” framing on blaming Chinese residents and the Chinese government will be greatest for Republicans. 
 
While the specific names of the topics differ from those in the main text, as well their prevalence results in 2b shows the impact of performance information 
framing on blame attribution correspond to the results reported in the main text. Namely, we observe that use of the term ‘Chinese virus’ does result in 
Republican participants blaming the public, it also shifts blame away from actors President Trump frequently criticized: Democrat governors, governors in 
general, and states governments.  
 
  
Figure 3a: 5 Most frequent topic proportions among Republican participants assigned to the Chinese virus and COVID-19 treatment for the question Who do you 
think did a bad job responding to the pandemic? In estimating these topics, prevalence is estimated using the scapegoat treatment.    
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Figure 3b: Graphical display of topical prevalence contrast between Republicans exposed to the term Chinese virus and COVID-19 for the question Who do you 
think did a bad job responding to the pandemic? Horizontal lines represent 95% confidence intervals. 
